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Abstract
This paper addresses the question of whether government procurement can work as
a de facto innovation policy tool. We develop an endogenous growth model with quality-
improving innovation that incorporates industries with heterogeneous innovation sizes.
Government demand in high-tech industries increases the market size in these industries
and, with it, the incentives for private ﬁrms to invest in R&D. At the economy-wide
level, the additional R&D induced in high-tech industries outweighs the R&D foregone
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 036in all remaining industries. The implications of the model are empirically tested using
a unique data set that includes federal procurement in U.S. states. We ﬁnd evidence
that a shift in the composition of government purchases toward high-tech industries
indeed stimulates privately funded company R&D.
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This paper addresses the question whether the inter-industry composition of government
purchases (hereafter procurement) works as a de facto innovation policy tool inducing addi-
tional private R&D in an economy. The idea that government procurement can stimulate
innovation is not new. It is grounded in the results of more general studies suggesting that
demand can spur private R&D and innovation (e.g., Gilﬁllan, 1935; Schmookler, 1962, 1966;
Sokoloﬀ, 1988). In this type of literature, it is typically assumed that demand (that is, market
size) increases the returns on innovative activities and the attractiveness of R&D investment
for ﬁrms. For instance, Moser (2005) ﬁnds that market size has an important inﬂuence on
both, the number of innovations and the distribution of innovative activity across industries.
Similarly, Acemoglu and Linn (2004) and Rosenberg (1969) suggest that demand “steers”
ﬁrms to address certain problems. Also endogenous growth models acknowledge the impor-
tance of market size and proﬁt incentives in innovation (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman
and Helpman, 1991a,b; Romer, 1990). Although it is typically not explicitly discussed in
these models, an increase in the size of the market translates into a larger proﬁt ﬂow for
each successful innovator and greater incentives to engage in R&D (Young, 1998). Following
this line of reasoning, the government, being an important customer, can inﬂuence R&D and
innovation as well. Empirical evidence at the ﬁrm level provides support for the conjecture
that public procurement, that is, the purchase by governments of goods and services, can
stimulate innovation (Aschhoﬀ and Sofka, 2009; Lichtenberg, 1987, 1988).
In the last years, public procurement has often been advocated as one meaningful way to
stimulate innovation (for an overview, see Edler and Georghiou, 2007) Many countries have
launched initiatives to foster government purchases of high-tech and innovative solutions
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historical examples suggesting that a number of highly inﬂuential technologies have been de-
veloped in the 20th century with the impetus from government demand, such as computers,
semiconductors, or the GPS (Mowery, 2008; Nelson, 1982; Ruttan, 2006). Moreover, Nelson
and Langlois (1983) show that the U.S. government was a major driver of the development
of technologies in which it was an important customer. Similarly, for Scandinavia, Berggren
and Laestadius (2003) and Fridlund (2000) indicate the public sector’s major impact on the
development of telecommunication technologies. The underlying argument is that the gov-
ernment can create and enlarge markets and thereby induce private R&D investment on a
scale that would not have otherwise followed even the most promising research results. It is
further suggested that the stimulus of private R&D and innovation by government procure-
ment is especially pronounced for the most advanced products (Cozzi and Impullitti, 2010;
Hart, 1998). Despite numerous anecdotes, however, there is little systematic evidence for
this reasoning. Moreover, the reallocation of procurement toward certain industries implies
that other industries are disadvantaged, with a priori no clear welfare implications. Finally,
econometric evidence for the impact of changes in the inter-industry composition of public
demand on private R&D in the economy is currently lacking. This paper attempts to ﬁll this
gap.
We develop a theoretical model to understand the transmission mechanism for the eﬀect
of government procurement on ﬁrms’ innovative behavior. We follow on stratum of the tra-
ditional endogenous growth theory in which long-term growth results from quality-improving
innovation (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 1991a,b), and add the
government as an additional source of demand (Cozzi and Impullitti, 2010). In the model,
4
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to diﬀer between industries (Minniti et al., 2008). Our main theoretical results indicate
that when government purchases are relatively in favor of industries with an above-average
quality jump, aggregate private R&D activities increase. The mechanism is as follows: A
change in the technological composition of public demand spending toward industries with
above-average quality jumps causes an increase in the expected proﬁts of ﬁrms trying to
innovate in these industries. The rewards for successful R&D activities increase because
higher innovation size implies higher markups over marginal cost. The shift in the allocation
of government demand toward high-tech industries induces more R&D on the level of the
aggregate economy because the increased R&D in high-tech industries outweighs the R&D
foregone in low-tech industries because of the smaller market there.
We test the predictions of the model regarding the eﬀect of the inter-industry composi-
tion of government procurement on private R&D activities for the U.S. To the best of our
knowledge, this study is the ﬁrst to empirically assess the eﬀect of the composition of govern-
ment purchases, as opposed to their sheer volume, on private R&D behavior. The analysis
is performed at the level of U.S. states for the period from 1999 to 2007. In particular, we
construct a unique panel data set consisting of federal procurement expenditures provided
by the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), cross-classiﬁed by type of industry. We
match the procurement data with privately sponsored company R&D spending. For the pur-
poses of the empirical study, industries with quality jumps above the economy-wide average
are proxied by high-tech industries using the standard industrial classiﬁcation developed by
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Hecker, 2005). The impact of a shift in the composition
of federal procurement toward high-tech industries on private R&D is assessed by a ﬁxed-
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time-variant variables that are correlated with the technological composition of government
procurement and company R&D. To instrument the composition of procurement we use the
fact that procurement in high-tech industries in particularly high in states whose governors
belong to the majority party in Congress. Governors expect that increases in procurement
will stimulate a state’s economic performance and therefore increase their re-election chances.
Procurement in high-tech industries is particularly attractive for politicians because it is more
prestigious than procurement in general. To deliver (high-tech industry) procurement to his
constituents, however, the governor needs support from the Congress, which holds the “power
of the purse.” As the party caucus represents a coalition that provides selective beneﬁts to
its members, Congressmen are more likely to transfer money to the state level if the state
is governed by a “friendly” politician. The respective governor, in turn, invests his political
capital to enhance the re-election chances of the Congressman.
The empirical analysis provides support for the prediction of our theoretical model,
namely, that a shift in the composition of federal procurement toward high-tech industries
stimulates private R&D activities. The results indicate that a doubling of government pur-
chases in high-tech industries relative to purchases in other industries is associated with a 6.8
percent increase in the amount of privately funded company R&D. Evaluated at the respec-
tive sample means, our results imply that if the high-tech ratio of government procurement
increased from 65 to 130 percent, privately funded company R&D would increase by approx-
imately $255 million (from $3,760 to $4,015 million). This result is robust under a range
of alternative speciﬁcations. In the instrumental variable (IV) approach, the coeﬃcient on
the high-tech ratio of procurement is positive but statistically insigniﬁcant. Because there
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estimators, namely, a reduction in eﬃciency and a large ﬁnite-sample bias, we emhasize more
the FE results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the basic model
linking ﬁrms’ R&D eﬀorts to the technological composition of government demand. In Section
III, we discuss the speciﬁcation and estimation issues concerning the empirical assessment of
the model’s implications. In Section IV, we introduce the data and describe the construction
of the key variables. Section V presents our ﬁndings. Section VI summarizes and concludes
with some policy implications.
2 Theory
To link government procurement to innovation and economic growth, we develop a simple
endogenous growth model. The economy in the model is closed and consists of two sectors: a
ﬁnal goods (or manufacturing) sector and a research sector where ﬁrms seek innovations. To
avoid unnecessary complications and to highlight the basic forces at work, labor is the only
input factor used in both sectors and is not further diﬀerentiated. Labor supply decisions are
treated as being exogenous. There is a continuum of industries in the unit interval indexed
by ω ∈ [0,1], with each industry producing exactly one consumption good (or product line).
The outputs of the diﬀerent industries substitute only imperfectly for each other. The set of
commodities is ﬁxed in the progress of time. Innovation is vertical, improving the quality of
each consumption good, and requires targeted R&D eﬀorts of ﬁrms at a respective product
line. Let the discrete variable j ∈ {0,1,2,...} denote the quality level. Each innovation in
7
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happen independently of each other. Thus, an improvement in one industry does not induce
an improvement in any other industry.
Diﬀerent from previous endogenous growth models with vertical innovation, which treated
industries symmetrically (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 1991a,b;
Li, 2001, 2003; Segerstrom, 1998), we assume the size of the quality jump after a successful
innovation to be uncertain and industry speciﬁc. In line with the more recent work by
Minniti et al. (2008), the realization of each R&D race is drawn independently from a Pareto
distribution. Modeling the size of the quality jump as a Pareto distributed random variable is
supported by the patent (including citations) literature. For instance, Scherer (1965) analyzes
the patent activities of the 500 largest ﬁrms in the U.S. He ﬁnds that the distribution of U.S.
patent values (measured by proﬁt returns) is highly skewed toward the low-value side and
heavy tailed to the high-value side, which comes fairly close to the generic properties of a
Pareto distribution. Similarly, in a more recent work, Harhoﬀ et al. (2005) ask patent holders
in Germany and in the U.S. to estimate the value of their inventions and ﬁnd a distribution
of values that is strikingly close to the Pareto distribution.
On the consumer side, each household is modeled as a dynastic family whose size increases
over time at an exogenous rate n. Each household member inelastically supplies labor in
exchange for wages. We normalize the total number of individuals at time t = 0 to unity by
the appropriate choice of unit. Thus, the population of workers at time t equals L(t) = ent.








Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 036where ρ denotes the rate of time preference, and logu(t) represents the ﬂow of util-
ity per household member at time t (see Barro, 1974; Kirman, 1992, for a discussion on














where d(j,ω,t) is the consumption of quality j in product line ω at time t. The utility
derived by an individual from consumption is therefore determined by the quality-weighted
amount of consumption integrated over all industries ω ∈ [0,1]. The preferences in (2) imply
that a consumer enjoys one unit of good ω that was improved j times as much as λj(ω,t)
units of the good if it had never been improved, with λ(ω,t) > 1. The logarithmic functional
form in (2) was chosen for simplicity and does not aﬀect the main results.






















where B(0) is the ex-ante endowment of asset holdings of the representative household,
w(t) is the wage rate earned by each individual, T(t) is a per capita lump-sum tax, and c(t) is
the ﬂow of individual consumer expenditures. Under the assumption that when a household
member is indiﬀerent between two quality vintages, the higher quality product is bought, the
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where p(j,ω,t) is the price of product ω with quality j at time t.
The dynamic optimization problem, that is, the allocation of lifetime expenditures over
time, consists of maximizing the discounted utility (1) subject to (2), (3), and the intertempo-




= r(t) − ρ. (4)
Because preferences are homothetic, the aggregate demand at time t in industry ω is
given by D(j,ω,t) = d(j,ω,t)L(t).
At any point in time, only one ﬁrm possesses the technology to produce the highest
quality product using one unit of manufacturing labor to produce one unit of output. The
best-practice ﬁrm has a quality advantage of λ over the next best quality in the industry.
The optimal strategy for the quality leader is to set the limit price pL(ω,t), preventing any
other ﬁrm in the industry from oﬀering its product without losses. The quality leader will set
a quality-adjusted price below the unit costs of its nearest competitor while that competitor
will come up with a price equal to his own marginal cost. The highest price the quality leader
can set to capture the entire industry market is his lead over the next best quality follower,
implying pL(ω,t) = λ(ω,t)w = λ(ω,t). There is no incentive for the quality leader to set a
price above the limit price because if he did, he would lose all of his customers.
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enues and is strictly nonnegative for all industries at any point in time. This assumption
allows us to isolate wealth eﬀects from the distortionary eﬀects of taxation. Similarly, the
government budget is assumed to be balanced at any time. To avoid unnecessary complica-
tions, we abstract from modeling any eﬀects of public demand expenditures on the individual
utility or on the marginal productivity of private input factors in manufacturing or research.
Denoting per capita public demand spending in industry ω at time t by G(ω,t), the quality
leader in each industry earns a proﬁt ﬂow of:
















corresponds to market size (sales to private and public
customers) for the product being produced in industry ω. The factor [λ(ω,t) − 1] is to be
interpreted as the markup over the marginal cost. Thus, the parameter λ(ω,t) describes the
degree of monopoly power. Given the preferences in (2), the proﬁts in (5) are independent
from the quality level, j.
There is free entry into R&D so that ﬁrms may target their research eﬀort at any industry.
Labor is the only input used in R&D and can be freely allocated between manufacturing and
research. The frictionless nature of the labor market implies that workers earn the same
wage in R&D as in manufacturing, w = 1. Research is directed in the sense that ﬁrms can
devote their R&D resources to developing state-of-the-art products in any industry (Acemoglu
and Linn, 2004). It is important to notice, however, that ﬁrms conduct R&D activities in
industries in which they are not the current quality leader, to not cannibalize their current
monopoly rents (Arrow, 1962; Fudenberg et al., 1983; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985). The aim
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a patent with inﬁnite patent length.1 All ﬁrms have access to the same R&D technology.
In industry ω at time t, a ﬁrm engaged in R&D that employs li(ω,t) units of labor faces a





where A > 0 is a given technology parameter, and X(ω,t) is a function that captures the
diﬃculty of conducting R&D, which is taken as given by each R&D ﬁrm.
The R&D technology in (6) reﬂects the stochastic nature of the innovation process, while
Ii(ω,t)dt is the probability to win the R&D race and become the next quality leader within
the time interval [t,t + dt]. In (6), the time interval approaches zero. Hence, Ii(ω,t) is to
be interpreted as the instantaneous probability of ﬁrm i being successful in ﬁnding the next
higher quality product per unit of time. Assuming that the probability of winning an R&D
race is independent across ﬁrms, across industries, and over time, the industry-wide arrival







i lI,i(ω,t) and I(ω,t) =
P
i Ii(ω,t) denote the R&D labor rate and the
accumulated arrival rate of innovation, resepctively, of all ﬁrms in industry ω at time t. The
speciﬁcation of the R&D technology in (7) implicitly assumes the existence of intra-industry
1 In reality, however, patent protection is often less attractive for ﬁrms than keeping new knowledge within
the ﬁrm (secrecy) or using other means to protect the research results (e.g., Cohen et al., 2000; Mansﬁeld,
1986).
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Diﬀerent from earlier R&D-driven endogenous growth models (Aghion and Howitt, 1992;
Grossman and Helpman, 1991a,b; Romer, 1990), in our model the long-run growth rate of
the economy is not inﬂuenced by the population size (no “scale eﬀect” property). Following
? and Segerstrom (1998), we assume that the R&D diﬃculty grows in each industry at a




where µ > 0 is exogenously given, and X(ω,0) = X0 for all ω. Similar to A in (6), the
parameter µ in (8) captures scientiﬁc opportunities in the economy.
Once a ﬁrm becomes successful in ﬁnding an innovation, the size of that innovation is
drawn from a Pareto distribution with a shape parameter 1/κ and a scale parameter equal







κ ,λ ∈ [1,∞), (9)
where κ ∈ (0,1) is a parameter that measures the degree of the dispersion or heterogeneity
of the Pareto distribution. The meam of the Pareto distribution equals 1/(1 − κ).
For analytical tractability, we assume that the initial distribution of λ values is given by
g(λ) at t = 0. Then, as the R&D dynamics start oﬀ and successfully innovating ﬁrms draw
new values of λ, the distribution of λ values does not change over time. Notice further that
X(ω,t) = X0 for all ω implies that I(ω,0) = I0 (constant) for all ω. Hence, a symmetric
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focus on this symmetric equilibrium in the further analysis.
Firms that participate in an R&D race issue securities on a perfect ﬁnancial market. Let
υe(ω,t) be the discounted value of expected proﬁts for ﬁrms in industry ω at time t. The






= r(t) + I(t), (10)
where πe(ω,t) denotes the expected proﬁts earned by a successful innovator. In the stock
market equilibrium, the expected dividend rate, πe(ω,t)/υe(ω,t), plus the expected rate of
capital gains, ˙ υe(ω,t)/υe(ω,t), is equal to the rate of return of the risk-free security plus a
risk premium. The latter is given by the ﬂow rate of innovation, I(t), because a producer
of the latest quality vintage who loses his leadership has a stock value of zero. Taking into
account that proﬁt maximization in R&D yields υe(ω,t) = X(ω,t)/A and and recalling that








Before we can derive an expression for the expected proﬁts of a ﬁrm winning an R&D race,
πe(ω,t), we have to specify how the government allocates its demand expenditures among
the various industries in our model economy.
Following Cozzi and Impullitti (2010), the allocation of government procurement across
industries is determined as follows:
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−ε1 for λ(ω,t) < 1
1−κ
ε2 for λ(ω,t) ≥ 1
1−κ
,
0 < ε1 < ¯ G,
0 < ε2 < ¯ G.
The ﬁrst term on the RHS of (12), ¯ G, denotes the average per capita public procurement,
that is, the value of public demand spending a quality leader in each industry ω will receive if
the government spreads its expenditures G(ω) evenly across all industries.2 Such symmetric
treatment of industries occurs for γ = 0. The second term on the RHS of (12) implies that
any γ > 0 corresponds to a public demand policy that more heavily promotes industries
with above-average quality jumps. Speciﬁcally, if the quality improvement caused by an
innovation in industry ω is smaller than the average economy-wide quality increment, public
purchases in this industry will be lower than in the symmetric case. However, if an innovator
in industry ω draws a value of λ above the average quality jump, he will beneﬁt more from
2 Because there is a continuum of industries indexed on the unit interval, average values in the model equal
total values.
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favorable the government treatment of industries is with above-average quality jumps vis-
à-vis industries with below-average jumps. We make the simplifying assumption that once
an industry experiences a quality jump above (below) the economy-wide average and γ 6= 0
holds, the government spends more (less) in this industry irrespective of how far beyond
the average this industry ﬁnds itself after the quality jump. It is straightforward to show
that the strictly positive values ε1 and ε2, which indicate how much government purchases
in “low-jump” or “high-jump” industries deviate from average spending, cannot be chosen
independently (see Appendix A). As stated above, the distribution of the λ values does not
change over time. Thus, although there is uncertainty at the industry level concerning the
size of the quality jump that occurs after an innovation arrives, there is always the same
share of industries with quality increments above or below the average at the macro level.
Moreover, to focus on the eﬀects of the inter-industry composition of government purchases,
we assume that ¯ G is constant (unless otherwise noted).
After solving (see Appendix B) for the expected ﬂow proﬁts of a ﬁrm winning an R&D




1+κL(t)[c(t) + ¯ G + γΓ]












> 0 and x(t) ≡ X(t)/L(t) is a measure of the
relative, that is, population-adjusted, R&D diﬃculty. Because the RHS of (13) does not
contain any industry-speciﬁc variables, υe(ω,t) = υe(t) is the average market valuation of a
successful innovation in the economy. In (13), the eﬀect of “creative destruction” is revealed;
the more research that occurs in an industry, the shorter, ceteris paribus, the duration of the
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the rate of population growth, n, in the denominator of (13), we also take into account that
aggregate consumer markets, and thus, proﬁts earned by a successful innovator increase with
a growing population.
Equation (13) already highlights the market size eﬀect in innovation: the greater ¯ G is,
that is, the larger the government market is for a new product, the more proﬁtable it is to be
the producer of that good. Another important implication of (13) is that the proﬁtability of
a successful innovation increases in γ. In other words, it is not only the size of government
demand that matters for the valuation of a successful innovator, but also how government
expenditures are distributed across industries. Speciﬁcally, the more heavily the government
promotes industries with relatively high quality jumps, the more attractive an innovation
becomes on average. However, although there is a positive eﬀect of the market size on the
expected ﬁrm value, it is still not clear whether there will also be more research eﬀort to
acquire this position. As we will show below, an increase in the size of the government
market that aﬀects all industries symmetrically will not stimulate additional R&D in this
economy.
To see this, we derive the R&D equilibrium condition from the condition for proﬁt maxi-





1+κ(c(t) + ¯ G + γΓ)




while the resource constraint of the economy (see Appendix C) reads:
1 =
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factor markets clear instantaneously.
The steady-state growth path of the economy (see Appendix D) is characterized by all
endogenous variables growing at a constant (although not necessarily at the same) rate and
a common research intensity, I(t), across industries. According to (7), the constant growth
rate of the R&D diﬃculty constrains I to be constant over time and equal to I∗ = n/µ. For
that reason, ˙ x/x = ˙ c/c = 0 is implied by (15). Then, r(t) = ρ prevails by (4), meaning that
in the steady state the market interest rate must equal the rate of time preference.
Using these results, as well as (7) and (29), the amount of labor devoted to R&D in the






n(1 + κ − µ) + µρ
. (16)
The positive relationship between ﬁrms’ R&D activities and γ established in this equation
is the main result of the model. An increase in γ, the parameter that determines to what
extent procurement takes place in industries with above-average quality jumps relative to
the remaining industries, instantly raises the expected value of becoming a quality leader
[see (13)]. Firms respond by investing more heavily in R&D, so the equilibrium value of the
average (and aggregate) R&D employment share increases. Consequently, by varying the
composition of its purchases in favor of industries with above-average innovative potential,
the government holds a leverage to stimulate private R&D spending.
The steady-state level of labor employed in R&D activities is not aﬀected by the volume
of per capita government demand expenditures, ¯ G. This result occurs because when the
government increases its demand spending, it takes away resources from the private sector.
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for-one, that is, dc∗/d ¯ G = −1. Therefore, a symmetric increase in government procurement
spending that equally aﬀects all industries does not stimulate additional R&D in the economy.
Equation (16) indicates a number of further determinants of the equilibrium share of R&D
employment. First, it can be easily shown that the growth in the total market size, n,
positively aﬀects R&D labor. Moreover, the larger the average size of innovations, that
is, the greater κ, and therefore the higher the limit price that a successful innovator can
charge, the more that is spent in relative terms on R&D. Finally, equation (16) indicates
that investment in R&D is also aﬀected by the technological research opportunities, µ. The
smaller µ is, the better the technological research opportunities are [see (8)], and, because
(ρ − n) > 03, the higher the equilibrium R&D employment is.
3 Empirical Speciﬁcation and Estimation Issues
The theoretical investigation of the industry-level eﬀects of government purchases laid out a
potential mechanism through which public demand spending might aﬀect innovative behavior
in industries and, with it, the rates of technological change and economic growth. The basis
for the empirical analysis is the result that the inter-industry composition of public demand
inﬂuences private R&D. According to (16), a shift in the structure of government purchases
toward industries with an above-average innovation potential stimulates private R&D in the
economy. This is due to a market size eﬀect of government procurement in these industries,
which raises the returns of successful R&D activities and creates incentives for ﬁrms to
privately invest in R&D in these industries. The economy-wide amount of private R&D
3 This parameter restriction is needed to ensure the convergence of the utility integral in (1).
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higher than the economy-wide average. The implications of the theoretical model are tested
at the level of U.S. states, mainly because of the availability of detailed procurement data at
the industry level.
The impact of the composition of government sales on privately funded company R&D
can be empirically assessed by considering (16). Adding other potential determinants, state
and time eﬀects, and log-transforming, equation (16) yields the following empirical model:
logRDi,t = α + β1 logHIGH−TECH−RATIOi,t−1 + β24logGDP i,t−1
+β3 logGDP i,t−1 + β4 logPOP i,t−1 + ξi + νt + ui,t,
(17)
where RDi,t is the amount of privately funded company R&D expenditures in state i
at time t. In the theoretical model, the private R&D input is measured in terms of R&D
employment. However, for the purposes of empirical analysis, we use the R&D expenditures.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no information available that would allow us to
distinguish the direct employment eﬀect of public procurement (R&D jobs to accomplish
a government contract) from the indirect eﬀect (additional company-funded R&D jobs).
HIGH−TECH−RATIOi,t−1 is the empirical approximation of γ from our theoretical model.
This variable is deﬁned as the ratio between non-R&D procurement in high-tech industries
and non-R&D procurement in all other industries at time t−1.4 HIGH−TECH−RATIO is
lagged by one period to account for the fact that procurement contracts appear in our data
with the date of contract signature while the eﬀective starting date might be later. Similarly,
privately funded company R&D might respond to federal procurement contracts only with a
4 See Section (4.1) for distinction between R&D and non-R&D procurement and the reasons to exclude the
former when constructing HIGH−TECH−RATIO.
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(private and public) market, which is denoted in the theoretical model as n. In addition,
to control for the eﬀect of the total market size on private R&D, we use both the level of
the GDP, GDP i,t−1, and the population size, POP i,t−1 (Moser, 2005; Sokoloﬀ, 1988). The
population, GDP, and GDP growth are lagged by one period to account for the fact that
ﬁrms decide on their future R&D investment using current information. The vectors ξi and
νt include the state and time ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively. The state ﬁxed eﬀects, ξi, account
for all kinds of unobserved time-invariant state-speciﬁc factors that might inﬂuence private
R&D. Similarly, νt captures the aggregate, macroeconomic factors, such as demand shocks
or policy changes, aﬀecting private R&D spending. Moreover, the time ﬁxed eﬀects also
account for the portion of technological opportunities (µ in the theoretical model) that is
common to all states. Omitting the state and time ﬁxed eﬀects in the regression will cause
biased estimates if these are correlated with any of the regressors. The error term is denoted
by ui,t.
Despite controlling for state and time ﬁxed eﬀects, the error terms within units may
still be correlated over time.5 In the presence of serial correlation, the ﬁxed-eﬀects (FE)
estimator will be ineﬃcient if the unobserved factors that cause the within-state correlation
of the residuals are uncorrelated with the included regressors; otherwise, the FE estimator
will also be biased. Tackling the problem of ineﬃciency, we follow previous literature and
use standard errors clustered at the state level to ensure valid statistical inferences in the
presence of serial correlation (Arellano, 1987; Hansen, 2007; White, 1980).6
5 Applying Wooldridge’s test for serial correlation (Wooldridge, 2002a) , we cannot reject the Null hypothesis
of no ﬁrst-order autocorrelation. However, there is no indication for higher-order autocorrelation.
6 If both, the AR(1) model for serial correlation and strict exogeneity hold, the FGLS estimator using
the Prais-Winsten transformation is asymptotically more eﬃcient than the FE estimator (Wooldridge,
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fect of government procurement composition on private R&D is problematic. Speciﬁcally,
there might be omitted variables that are correlated with both private R&D and government
procurement or even jointly determine them. For instance, because of the local industry
structure, we may observe a positive correlation between federal high-tech procurement and
private R&D. Changes in the within-state industry structure are not captured in the ﬁxed
eﬀects. Moreover, federal procurement contracts might be contingent on certain ﬁrm char-
acteristics, such as lobbying activities or management quality that are also systematically
related to ﬁrm R&D. In other cases, high-tech industry procurement may be used strategi-
cally as a policy means to stimulate the local economy. Hence, the estimates of the impact
of government procurement on private R&D might be biased while the direction of the bias
is not clear. Our strategy for dealing with the various sources of estimation bias is to apply
an IV approach. The instrument is discussed in Section 5.4. Before turning to the empirical
analysis, we ﬁrst introduce the data and indicators.
4 Data and Variable Construction
4.1 Federal non-R&D Procurement
Our information on government purchases by state and industry stems from the Federal
Procurement Data System – Next Generation (FPDS-NG), provided by the U.S. General
Services Administration (GSA). Federal agencies are required by the Federal Acquisition
Regulation to report all contract actions of more than $2,500 directly to the FPDS-NG.
2002b). However, when T is small and strict exogeneity does not hold, FGLS tends to exacerbate the bias
(Wooldridge, 2002a).
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in the data.7 FPDS-NG reports the federal contracts for each company that is a separate
legal entity, independent of the parent company (Goldman et al., 2008). The information
provided contains, inter alia, the contract volume, award and completion dates, place of
performance, whether a contract is primarily for R&D, Federal Product and Service Code
(PSC), and, since 2001, the industry (NAICS) to which a contract can be assigned. The
FPDS-NG database contains records of more than 32 million contract actions between 1978
and 2009.
To construct the procurement high-tech ratio, we use only federal non-R&D procurement.
Federal R&D procurement reﬂects the government demand for completely new products,
processes, or systems, which essentially means that ﬁrms conduct R&D by the order of the
government (David et al., 2000). It has been suggested that R&D procurement is often
idiosyncratic, and the results of federally funded research are only applicable to the private
market to a limited degree (Kanz, 1993; Lichtenberg, 1989). Hence, R&D procurement is
less suited to capture the market-size eﬀect of public procurement on private R&D decisions
suggested by our theoretical model. One should notice, however, that non-R&D procurement
might also contain a R&D component. Unfortunately, the FPDS-NG data do not allow
7 It could be objected that by looking only at federal procurement we miss an important part of general
public procurement. The OECD estimates that, in the U.S., the volume of procurement by state and
other local agencies is almost twice the volume of federal procurement (Audet, 2002). In particular,
the omission of state and local level procurement is problematic if there are systematic diﬀerences in the
content of procurement by federal and sub-national procurement agencies, for example, with respect to the
technological composition of procurement. However, there is no a priori reason to believe that procurement
by federal and sub-national agencies diﬀer from each other (see, e.g., Coggburn, 2003). Moreover, to the
best of our knowledge, sub-national procurement entities do not provide data at a level of detail necessary
for our analysis. However, using only data on federal procurement has an important advantage as it is
more likely to be independent of state-level characteristics, thereby reducing the problem of endogeneity
discussed in Section 3.
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of non-R&D contracts is not to conduct research on behalf of the government (GSA, 2005).
Moreover, R&D performed under federal non-R&D contracts is much more likely to also have
applications to the private market (Lichtenberg, 1990), thereby creating additional incentives
for private investment in R&D.
We classify procurement expenditures according to the date of the contract signature.
Moreover, we use the gross contract value, that is, the number of dollars initially obligated
by the action. De-obligations are not subtracted because they are typically not foreseeable
at the date of the contract signature and, thus, are not factored in by ﬁrms in their R&D
decisions. However, by not accounting for de-obligations, we implicitly assume that the
cancellation, downward adjustment, or deletion of a previously recorded obligation does not
aﬀect private R&D decisions.
Testing our model’s implications requires identifying procurement in industries with
above- and below average quality jumps, respectively. Closest to the theoretical model would
be an industry classiﬁcation according to the average quality jump, measured, for instance, by
the average markup of price over marginal cost. However, to the best of our knowledge, esti-
mates of markups for U.S. industries are available only at the 2-digit NAICS level (e.g., Diew-
ert and Fox, 2008; Hall, 1988; Oliveira Martins et al., 1996; Roeger, 1995), which is too broad
to meaningfully distinguish industries with respect to their innovation capacity. Thus, for the
purposes of the empirical study, we approximate industries in which quality jumps above the
economy-wide average by high-tech industries. To identify high-the industries, we refer to the
industrial classiﬁcation provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The BLS classiﬁes
industries as high-tech if the percentage of science, engineering, and technical occupations in
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2005).8 According to this deﬁnition, we classiﬁed the following industries as high-tech: Phar-
maceutical and medicine manufacturing (NAICS 3254), Computer and peripheral equipment
manufacturing (NAICS 3341), Communications equipment manufacturing (NAICS 3342),
Semiconductor and other electronic component manufacturing (NAICS 3344), Navigational,
measuring, electro-medical, and control instruments manufacturing (NAICS 3345), Aerospace
product and parts manufacturing (NAICS 3364), Software publishers (NAICS 5512), Inter-
net publishing and broadcasting (NAICS 5161), Other telecommunications (NAICS 5179),
Internet service providers and Web search portals (NAICS 5181), Data processing, hosting,
and related services (NAICS 5182), Architectural, engineering, and related services (NAICS
5413), Computer systems design and related services (NAICS 5415), and Scientiﬁc research-
and-development services (NAICS 5417).
Prior to 2001, the FPDS-NG data contain mainly PSC information, while industry infor-
mation (NAICS) is only scarcely reported. However, since 2001 the FPDS-NG procurement
data contain information on both the PSC and NAICS codes for almost all contracts. We
develop a PSC-NAICS concordance based on contract data during the period from 2001 to
2009 for which both the PSC and NAICS were available to assign NAICS codes to contracts
with missing industry classiﬁcation (see Appendix E). We use the original NAICS codes and
the concordance (if the NAICS code was missing) to classify industries as either high-tech or
8 An alternative classiﬁcation of high-tech industries, relying on industrial R&D spending, is provided by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis in its R&D Satellite Account (Fraumeni and Okubo, 2005). The R&D
Satellite Account data are based on the industry-level R&D series collected by the National Science
Foundation. However, we do not use this classiﬁcation because, due to a mistake in the classiﬁcation
methodology, a large part of R&D before 2004 was erroneously attributed to the wholesale trade industry.
In reality, this R&D was mostly performed in pharmaceutical and computer manufacturing companies.
Despite the fact that since 2004 the NSF has released a revised industry classiﬁcation, the BEA still uses
the unrevised methodology (NSF, 2007; Robbins et al., 2007).
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Finally, we exclude federal purchases from public-sector ﬁrms (NAICS 92) from the sample
and aggregate the remaining procurement contracts to the state level. We construct the high-
tech ratio, as a measure of the technological content of procurement, by computing the ratio
between procurement in high-tech industries and procurement in all other industries.
4.2 Privately Funded Company R&D Expenditures
Our data on privately funded company R&D spending are taken from the U.S. Survey of
Industrial R&D (SIRD), administered by the National Science Foundation (NSF). The NSF
provides estimates of domestically performed R&D expenditures by the source of funding
(private and public) for states and industries based on a survey with a stratiﬁed representative
sample of ﬁrms with ﬁve or more employees. We focus on data on privately funded company
R&D because we want to investigate whether an increase in market size due to government
procurement creates incentives for ﬁrms to invest their own money in R&D. The SIRD data
are biannual from 1981 to 1997 and annual since then. Because of disclosure limitations,
the series on privately funded R&D expenditures has a nonnegligible share of missing values.
An observation is missing when the number of surveyed ﬁrms in a state is low. However,
the severity of this problem generally declines over time. Hence, we restrict our analysis to
the period from 1999 to 2007. One the one hand, narrowing down the sample period allows
us to use annual data with only a few missing values for privately funded R&D. On the
other hand, the NSF provides data on the number of surveyed ﬁrms by state and year only
from 1999 on. We use the number of ﬁrms in a Heckman selection model to account for the
potential selection bias. In two states (New Hampshire and Rhode Island), however, privately
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are dropped from the sample. R&D spending is measured in constant dollars, using the
aggregate GDP deﬂator with the base year 2000.9
It could be objected that our R&D and procurement data are not fully compatible because
they are based on diﬀerent reporting units. In particular, the reporting unit for the SIRD data
is the company with all subsidiaries while R&D is assigned to ﬁrms’ headquarters location.
The procurement data in the FPDS-NG are reported for the actual place of performance.
Thus, if the headquarters and place of performance are not located in the same state, we are
likely to underestimate the impact of procurement. Moreover, survey-based SIRD data may
not capture R&D spending in small ﬁrms well. In fact, ﬁrms with less than ﬁve employees
are even excluded from the survey. It has also been argued that small ﬁrms typically do
R&D on the job and purchase capital-embodied technology rather than innovate themselves
(Kleinknecht et al., 2002). Therefore, the R&D survey data might underestimate R&D eﬀorts
within small ﬁrms (Patel and Pavitt, 1995). However, small ﬁrms are also less likely to be
recipients of government contracts.
4.3 Population and GDP
Population data are taken from midyear estimates reported by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). Data on the GDP (in real terms) are also obtained from the BEA. The
GDP is deﬂated using the state-speciﬁc deﬂator for the year 2000, which better reﬂects the
within-state composition of industries than the aggregate GDP deﬂator (BEA, 2006). Our
9 To the best of our knowledge, reliable output-based R&D deﬂators, that is, price-deﬂators that take into
account productivity gains in the R&D output, are currently not available. Using the aggregate GDP
deﬂator does not change our results because the deﬂator is the same for all states and is, thus, controlled
away by the year dummies.
27
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 036ﬁnal dataset covers 48 U.S. states in the period from 1999 to 2007.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Federal non-R&D Procurement Composition and Private R&D
– A descriptive analysis
In our empirical analysis, we will exploit the within-state (over time) relationship between
the technological composition of federal non-R&D procurement spending, that is, the pro-
curement high-tech ratio, and privately funded company R&D. However, our identiﬁcation
strategy rests on the assumption that the procurement high-tech ratio in a state is inde-
pendent of state characteristics that are not accounted for and that there are no further
mechanisms in the background which jointly inﬂuence the procurement high-tech ratio and
company R&D. This section provides a closer examination of the mechanisms driving the ge-
ographic distribution of federal procurement spending. This examination allows us to verify
the plausibility of the above assumption and to better understand and interpret the ﬁndings
of the subsequent econometric analysis.
Figure 1 provides some insights on how the federal government allocates non-R&D pro-
curement (in high-tech industries and in all other industries) across states. Not surpris-
ingly, the total amount of both types of procurement seem to be higher in large (in terms
of population), innovative (in terms of privately funded company R&D), and economically
powerful (in term of the GDP) states. The respective cross-sectional correlations are be-
tween 0.60 and 0.74. However, federal non-R&D procurement relative to privately funded
company R&D tends to be higher in smaller, less innovative, and economically less powerful
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other industries typically exceeds company R&D. The cross-state correlations between the
procurement-to-private-R&D-ratio and privately funded company R&D, population, and the
GDP are between -0.13 and -0.24 for both procurement types.
Figure 1 also reveals signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the development (over time) of federal non-
R&D procurement and private R&D in the individual states. Non-R&D procurement in high-
tech industries increased in most of the states (38 of 50, or 76 percent), remained virtually
unchanged in eleven states (22 percent), and declined only in one state. Procurement in all
industries except high-tech industries increased in 48 states and did virtually not change in
the other two. Similarly, privately funded company R&D increased or remained constant in
the majority of states. For almost all the states, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive correlation
between both types of federal non-R&D procurement and privately funded company R&D.
It also seems that the increase in procurement was relatively strong in periods in which the
increase in private R&D was less pronounced. Overall, these ﬁrst ﬁndings suggest that the
federal government might allocate procurement so as to support relatively small states that
are not performing well.
Figure 2 depicts the procurement high-tech ratio and privately funded company R&D in
the U.S. by state. While Figure 1 indicates that the government might strategically use pro-
curement (in general) to stimulate economically weak states, Figure 2 does not provide clear
evidence that particularly high-tech procurement is used for this purpose. The procurement
high-tech ratio seems slightly (not signiﬁcantly) higher in large, innovative, and economically
powerful states. The correlations between the procurement high-tech ratio and privately
funded company R&D, population, and the GDP are positive, but rather weak (0.12-0.15)
29













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 036and not signiﬁcant. However, the procurement high-tech ratio seems to be slightly higher in
states in which the federal government is an important customer. The correlation between
the procurement high-tech ratio and the share of federal non-R&D procurement in the total
GDP is weak but positive (0.21).
Between 1999 and 2007, one can observe an upward shift in the procurement high-tech
ratio in 19 states (38 percent) while it remained unchanged in 13 states (26 percent) and
decreased in 18 states (36 percent). Within states, on average, we ﬁnd a weak positive cor-
relation (0.12-0.15) between the procurement high-tech ratio and privately funded company
R&D, population, the GDP, share of privately funded company R&D in the GDP, and the
share of federal non-R&D procurement in the GDP. In general, the procurement high-tech
ratio seems to be a fairly good predictor of privately funded company R&D. Only in a few
cases did the procurement high-tech ratio increase in periods when private R&D decreased
or stagnated.
Overall, the visual inspection of the data does not reveal clear-cut patterns suggesting that
the technological composition of federal non-R&D procurement is contingent on observable
state-speciﬁc characteristics. However, we cannot rule out that there are further unobserved
characteristics that inﬂuence the distribution of federal procurement across states and over
time.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 036Finally, in Figure 3, the procurement high-tech ratio as a measure of the technological
content of government procurement is plotted against privately funded company R&D for
years from 1999 to 2007. Because the econometric representation of the relationship between
procurement composition and company R&D from the theoretical model in equation (17) is
in log-linear terms, both variables are measured in logs. Moreover, for the reasons explained
in Section 3, we lag the procurement high-tech ratio by one year.10 As indicated by the ﬁtted
line, we observe a positive relationship between the technological content of procurement
and privately funded company R&D in a pooled cross section. The correlation between the
two variables is equal to 0.40. Below, we more rigorously investigate this relationship by
controlling for unobserved time-invariant state characteristics and a number of other factors.
Figure 3: Technological composition of federal non-R&D procurement and private R&D in




































−4 −2 0 2
High−tech ratio procurement (log) t−1
10 The picture does not change in qualitative terms if we refrain from log-transforming the data and/or from
lagging the procurement high-tech ratio.
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In this section, we present the results from the baseline econometric analysis of the impact of
a reallocation of federal non-R&D procurement in favor of high-tech industries on privately
funded company R&D. The results from the FE estimation of equation (17) are reported
in Table 1. All models in the remainder of this paper are estimated using cluster robust
standard errors, where each state forms one cluster. All variables are measured in natural
logs; thus, the coeﬃcients can be interpreted as elasticities.11
11 Pairwise correlation coeﬃcients of the variables are reported in Appendix F.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 036Table 1: Technological composition of federal non-R&D procurement and private R&D –
Fixed-eﬀects estimation.
Dependent: Company RandD
High-tech ratio (t-1) 0.068∗∗
(0.032)
Real GDP Growth (t-1) -0.434
(0.843)






Time ﬁxed eﬀects Yes





Notes: Results of FE estimation of equation (17). Because of missing observations for privately funded
company R&D (see Section 4), the sample includes 412 observations from 48 states over the period from
1999 to 2007. New Hampshire and Rhode Island are dropped as there is only one non-missing value for
the dependent variable in our period of observation for these states. The GDP, privately funded company
R&D expenditures, and procurement are originally measured in millions of constant (2000) dollars. The
procurement high-tech ratio is deﬁned as the ratio between federal non-R&D procurement in high-tech
industries and in all other industries. Gross procurement values are used, that is, de-obligations are not
subtracted. Robust standard errors (clustered by state) in parentheses. * 10 percent level of signiﬁcance. **
5 percent level of signiﬁcance. *** 1 percent level of signiﬁcance.
The estimation results support the predictions of the theoretical model. We ﬁnd a pos-
itive and statistically signiﬁcant (at 5 percent level) relationship between the technological
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imply that a doubling of the procurement high-tech ratio, that is, a doubling of government
purchases in high-tech industries relative to purchases in other industries, is associated with
a 6.8 percent increase in the amount of privately funded company R&D. Evaluated at the
respective sample means, our results imply that if the procurement high-tech ratio increased
from 65 to 130 percent, privately funded company R&D would increase by approximately
$255 million (from $3,760 to $4,015 million).
The total size of the market demand, measured as the level of the GDP, also inﬂuences
private R&D activities; the estimated coeﬃcient on GDP i,t−1 is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant at 5 percent level. The GDP growth rate is not statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting
that a growing market alone might not be suﬃcient for private companies to invest in R&D.
The estimated coeﬃcient for population as an alternative proxy for market size is not statis-
tically signiﬁcant either. However, it becomes signiﬁcant if the level of the GDP is excluded
from the regression (results not reported). One may interpret this ﬁnding as an indication
that the GDP is a better proxy for the size of the market than the population.
5.3 Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we test the robustness of the ﬁndings in the baseline speciﬁcation (Section 5.2).
First, we apply a Heckman selection model to allow for potential data-reporting/selection
bias due to missing values on the dependent variable (see Section 4). Then, we perform
the analysis using the net value of the federal non-R&D procurement (dollars de-obligated
are subtracted from the dollars originally obligated by a contract) to construct the high-
tech ratio of federal non-R&D procurement. Finally, instead of applying the PSC-NAICS
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 036concordances to assign missing industry codes (NAICS) to procurement contracts, we only
use those procurement contracts for which NAICS information was originally available in the
FPDS-NG database (see Section 4.1). The results are reported in Table 2.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 036Table 2: Technological composition of federal non-R&D procurement and private R&D –
Robustness checks.
(1) (2) (3)
Heckman Selection With Deobligations Old NAICS
High-tech ratio (t-1) 0.068∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.036∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.020)
Real GDP growth (t-1) -0.434 -0.428 -0.324
(0.829) (0.853) (0.865)
Real GDP (t-1) 1.361∗∗ 1.372∗∗ 1.382∗∗
(0.651) (0.656) (0.649)
Population (t-1) 0.081 0.078 -0.320
(0.873) (0.888) (0.868)
Constant -10.740 -10.233 -4.334
(9.907) (9.981) (10.568)
Time ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
State ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 450 412 411
States 50 48 48
R-squared within 0.140 0.142
F 10.316 8.813
Notes: Results of robustness analysis of the baseline estimation of equation (17) provided in Table 1. In
Column 1, a Heckman selection model is applied to account for any potential data-reporting/selection bias.
We use as exclusion restriction the (log of the) number of ﬁrms sampled in the SIRD survey (see Section 4.2)
as information on private R&D spending is typically missing because of disclosure limitations. This variable
is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level in the selection equation (results not reported). In Column 2, the net
value of the federal non-R&D procurement (dollars de-obligated are subtracted from the dollars originally
obligated by a contract) to construct the high-tech ratio of federal non-R&D procurement (see Section 4.1).
In Column 3, we only rely on the original NAICS information provided in the FPDS-NG database (see Section
4.1). There are only 411 observations in this speciﬁcation because no procurement in high-tech industries is
reported in Maine in 1998. Robust standard errors (clustered by state) in parentheses. * 10 percent level of
signiﬁcance. ** 5 percent level of signiﬁcance. *** 1 percent level of signiﬁcance.
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The results from both, the Heckman model (Column 1) and the FE regression using the net
value of procurement (after excluding de-obligations, Column 2) are virtually identical to
those from the baseline estimation reported in Table 1. When not applying the PCS-NAICS
concordance, that is, using only cases in which NAICS information was originally available in
the FPDS-NG data, the estimated coeﬃcient on the procurement high-tech ratio is somewhat
smaller but still signiﬁcant (at the 10 percent level). Overall, these results indicate that the
positive association between the technological content of procurement and company R&D
found in the baseline speciﬁcation is robust to a range of alternative speciﬁcations. The rela-
tionship is neither subject to selection issues, nor particularly dependent on the construction
of the variable of main interest (with or without de-obligations) and the implementation of
the PSC-NAICS concordance.
5.4 IV Estimation
As discussed in Section 3, one should be careful when drawing a causal inference from the
results of the FE estimation. In the baseline estimation of equation (17) presented in Table
1, state and year dummies are included to account for possible confounding factors due
to various unobserved state-speciﬁc and year (aggregate) eﬀects that do not change over
time. However, there might be further unobserved time-variant, unit-speciﬁc factors that are
correlated with federal procurement or that even jointly determine federal procurement and
company R&D. Not accounting for these will cause the FE estimator to be biased. One way
to deal with this problem is to apply an IV approach, using an instrument that captures an
exogenous part of the variation in the technological content of federal purchases across states
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Our instrument relies on the idea that politicians can inﬂuence the distribution of the
high-tech ratio of federal procurement across states and over time. In particular, we ar-
gue that if the party holding control of the governorship in a state also has a majority in
the Congress, more and primarily high-tech industry procurement is targeted to the state.
The assumption underlying our instrument is that politicians channel federal procurement
to their constituency in order to “reward” supporters for their votes and to increase their
electoral fortune in future elections (Arnold, 1979; Levitt and Snyder, 1997; Shepsle and
Weingast, 1981; Stein and Bickers, 1994). As it is generally diﬃcult to deliver direct mone-
tary payback, politicians divert speciﬁc investments or procurement contracts to their states
(Aghion et al., 2009; Atlas et al., 1995; Cohen and Noll, 1991; Levitt and Snyder, 1997; Mayer,
1995). For instance, there is anecdotal evidence of intervention by members of the House
of Representatives to prevent the Department of Defense or the Pentagon from taking away
military procurement projects from their constituency (Hoover and Pecorino, 2005). Newspa-
per accounts also sometimes refer to government procurement as pork barrel spending (e.g.,
Wheeler, 2004).
However, not all types of procurement spending are equally likely to be strategically dis-
tributed to states in the pursuit of political gain. Voters make decisions on the basis of
judgments about politicians’ contribution to the economy (Arnold, 1979). In this respect,
allocating federal procurement to local high-tech industries is likely yielding higher electoral
beneﬁts than other types of procurement because promoting high-tech industries is typically
assumed to be a promising measure to stimulate the local economy (that is, to secure and/or
create jobs, to raise innovativeness and long-term international competitiveness, etc.). More-
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(Cohen and Noll, 1991). Such high-tech projects usually receive much public attention and
are therefore beneﬁcial for the politician’s prestige (for a related argument, see Steinberg,
1995).
To channel (high-tech) federal procurement to his state, a governor needs “support” from
the Congress. According to Article I of the U.S. Constitution, the Congress holds the “power
of the purse” and is the main locus of the “distributive game.”12 The majority party in
Congress is entitled to signiﬁcant agenda control power because it selects the chairmen of
committees authorizing and appropriating funds and receives a majority on these committees
(Evans, 1991; Fenno, 1973).13 There is an incentive for the Congress majority party to support
governors of the same party by allocating of federal procurement contracts to ﬁrms in the
respective state because, following Grossman Grossman (1994) and Shor (2005), the party
caucus represents a coalition that provides selective beneﬁts to its members. State politicians,
in return, invest their political capital to support (the re-election of) the Congressmen in their
states.
A number of previous studies provide evidence for policy-related determinants of the
distribution of federal spending. Using Indian data, Dasgupta et al. (2004) ﬁnd that states
governed by the party that also controls the central government receive more grants. The
authors argue that the allocation of federal funds to a governor of the opponent party can
generate a “leakage” eﬀect and losses of some of the beneﬁt from spending. In the same vein,
12 The president might also play an important role both in the budget process and as chief executive. Studies
that investigate the role of the president in the geographic distribution of federal funds are nonetheless
sparse (Larcinese et al., 2006).
13 Aghion et al. (2009) provide evidence that House and Senate appropriation committees aﬀect the geo-
graphic distribution of educational spending.
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providing them the highest returns on their “investments.” Balla et al. (2002), in a study
of academic earmarks, report that districts represented by majority party House members
receive higher funds than those represented by the minority. Alvarez and Saving (1997)
generalize this ﬁnding to other types of federal funds. Levitt and Snyder (1995) study federal
assistance programs in the period from 1984 to 1990 and ﬁnd that a Democratic majority
in Congress is associated with higher spending for districts mainly populated by Democratic
voters.
For the purpose of the empirical analysis, we construct our instrument as a dichotomous
variable that takes the value of 1 in states whose governors are aﬃliated with the majority
party in the House of Representatives and 0 otherwise.14 The variation in our instrument
comes from two sources, namely, House and governor elections. It could be objected that the
outcome of gubernatorial elections might be related to state-speciﬁc characteristics. However,
the outcome of a Congressional election is exogenous to speciﬁc states, and our instrument
indicates the party coincidence at the state and federal levels. Moreover, the timing of House
and gubernatorial elections is exogenously given. Hence, our instrument should not be re-
lated to state-speciﬁc characteristics that are correlated with company R&D. . Because of
14 Although the Congress consists of two chambers, that is, the House and the Senate, we use political
alignment between state governors and the House majority as our main speciﬁcation. The reason is that
there has always been a clear majority in the House in our sample period. The House majority was
Republican in all years covered by the dataset. In the Senate, the majority party has not always been
unambiguous. From 2001 to 2002 and 2007 to 2008, Democrats and Republicans provided the same
number of Senators. However, according to the U.S. Constitution, the Vice President breaks a tied vote
in Senate. From 2001 to 2008, the Republican Dick Cheney assumed the position of Vice President. One
might therefore regard the Senate as being under Republican leadership in our period of observation as
well. In this case, the coincidence of the governor’s party and the Senate majority delivers exactly the
same results as those reported below. Apparently, if one is willing to accept the assumption of Republican
leadership in the Senate during our period of observation, the results also remain in place when the dummy
variable indicates that the governor is a member of the majority party in both chambers of Congress.
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instrumental variable to be positively associated with procurement in high-tech industries,
and thereby with the high-tech intensity of federal procurement. Put diﬀerently, we expect
federal procurement in high-tech industries to be relatively high (compared with procure-
ment in other industries) in states whose governors belong to the party holding the majority
in the House. The instrument is lagged by one year behind the endogenous regressor to
account for the lag in the budget cycle. Current federal procurement budgets have normally
been appropriated in previous budgetary years Alvarez and Saving (1997); Elis et al. (2009);
Larcinese et al. (2006).15
In Table 3, we explicitly test the assumption that politicians prefer to deliver high-tech
procurement to their constituents, thereby changing the technological composition of pro-
curement in a way that is uncorrelated with a state’s R&D prospects. To do so, we separately
regress our instrument on the level of both high-tech procurement and all other procurement.
The results indicate that states with a governor aﬃliated with the majority party in the House
receive relatively more high-tech industry procurement (Column 1). The amount of other
types of procurement, however, seems to be unaﬀected by the coincidence of the governor’s
party and the majority in the House (Column 2).16
15 We also experimented with diﬀerent lag structures, which provided results qualitatively similar to those
reported below.
16 The results do not change if we drop New Hampshire and Rhode Island from the sample.
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federal non-R&D procurement by procurement type.
(1) (2)
High-tech All other
Coincidence Gov-House (t-1) 0.207∗∗∗ -0.019
(0.072) (0.045)
Real GDP Growth -1.001 1.664∗∗
(1.867) (0.768)






Time ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
State ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Observations 450 450
States 50 50
R-squared within 0.450 0.707
F 21.702 57.187
Notes: Fixed-eﬀects results of regressing our instrument on federal procurement in high-tech and all other
industries, respectively. Coincidence Gov-House is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if a state governor
belongs to the majority party in the House and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable is lagged by one period to
take into account delays between the appropriation of federal funds and the moment when these are actually
spent. The results remain qualitatively unchanged if we drop New Hampshire and Rhode Island. Robust
standard errors (clustered by state) in parentheses. * 10 percent level of signiﬁcance. ** 5 percent level of
signiﬁcance. *** 1 percent level of signiﬁcance.
The results of the IV regressions are presented in Table 4. In Column 1, we report
the results of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. We ﬁnd that the estimated
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results in Table 1, somewhat larger. Assuming correct point estimates, this indicates that
the FE results even underestimate the true causal eﬀect of the government procurement
composition on private R&D activities, which is consistent with previous ﬁndings on total
non-R&D procurement (Lichtenberg, 1988). A intuitive explanation for this result is that
the distribution of federal procurement is (partly) determined by issues other than eﬃciency.
For instance, federal contracts might be awarded to stimulate ﬁrms that are not performing
well and, in consequence, do not spend a lot on R&D. However, in the IV approach, the
coeﬃcient on the high-tech composition of procurement is not statistically signiﬁcant. A
possible explanation for the stark increase in the standard error is the eﬃciency loss entailed
in the IV estimator compared with the FE estimator. It might be that our instrument
explains little of the variation in the potentially endogenous explanatory variable. In the
ﬁrst stage, the instrument has the expected positive sign and is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent
level (p-value: 0.039). However, the F statistic for the excluded instrument, being only
equal to 4.49, suggests the weakness of our instrument. As discussed by Staiger and Stock
(1997) and Stock et al. (2002) for a single endogenous regressor, the F-statistic typically
must exceed 10 for inferences based on the 2SLS estimator to be reliable. Weak instruments
can lead to inconsistencies in the IV estimates and tend to exacerbate the ﬁnite-sample bias
that IV approaches suﬀer from (Bound et al., 1995; Nelson and Startz, 1990). Moreover,
in the presence of weak instruments, the conventional asymptotic approximations used for
hypothesis tests and conﬁdence intervals are usually unreliable (Stock et al., 2002; Temple
and Wößmann, 2006).
The Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimator is preferred to the 2SLS
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estimates based on Fuller’s (1977) modiﬁcation of the LIML estimator, which ensures that
the estimator has ﬁnite moments. The Fuller estimation delivers comparable results to those
of the 2SLS regressions. The coeﬃcient on the technological content of procurement is
somewhat more precisely estimated yet is still not signiﬁcant.
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Instrumental variable estimates, second-stage results.
(1) (2)
2SLS LIML (Fuller)
High-tech ratio (t-1) 0.119 0.113
(0.192) (0.172)
Real GDP Growth (t-1) -0.256 -0.275
(1.165) (1.118)
Real GDP (t-1) 1.412∗∗ 1.407∗∗
(0.634) (0.631)
Population (t-1) 0.105 0.103
(0.907) (0.903)
Time ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
State ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Observations 412 412
States 48 48
F (excluded instrument) 4.490 4.490
(0.039) (0.039)
R-squared within (second stage) 0.127 0.129
F (second stage) 7.092 7.043
Notes: Results from a 2SLS (column 1) and LIML (column 2) estimation of the eﬀect of federal procurement
composition on private R&D spending. The instrument is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the
state governor belongs to the majority party in the House and 0 otherwise. The instrument is lagged by
one period to take into account delays between the appropriation of federal funds and the moment when
these funds are actually spent. In the LIML estimation, the user-speciﬁed constant (alpha) is set to 1 (see
Temple and Wößmann, 2006). Robust standard errors (clustered by state) in parentheses. * 10 percent level
of signiﬁcance. ** 5 percent level of signiﬁcance. *** 1 percent level of signiﬁcance.
Although our instrument has some intuitive appeal, we cannot rule out that the 2SLS
and LIML estimators are biased because of the presence of a weak instrument problem. This
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namely, that both the coeﬃcient estimates and the conﬁdence intervals may be sensitive to
small numbers of observations (Bound et al., 1995; Temple and Wößmann, 2006). Taking
further into account that IV estimates are less eﬃcient than their FE counterparts, we tend to
place more weight on the FE ﬁndings earlier in the paper. However, in light of the apparent
weakness of our instrument, we are not yet able to convincingly establish a causal eﬀect of
federal procurement composition on company R&D at the state level.
6 Conclusions
The goal of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the inter-industrial composition
of government demand and ﬁrms’ R&D decisions both from a theoretical and an empirical
perspective. First, we develop a generalized version of a Schumpeterian growth model that
incorporates a typical trait of real economies, namely, the presence of industries characterized
by diﬀerent innovation sizes. This asymmetry causes the distribution of monopoly proﬁts
from successful innovation to be highly skewed toward the low-value side with a long tail to
the high-value side. We use the model to analyze the eﬀects of a change in the technological
content of government procurement. Our results indicate a role for public procurement in
the debate on innovation and growth policy. According to the theoretical model, a change
in the composition of government purchases that relatively favors industries with above-
average quality jumps, that is, high-tech industries, stimulates R&D activities at the level
of the economy. The intuition for this result is as follows: Government procurement is an
additional source of demand, raising the returns from successful R&D activities. Government
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these industries, while R&D investment in all other industries becomes less attractive. At the
economy-wide level, however, the additional R&D induced in high-tech industries outweighs
the R&D foregone in all remaining industries; thus, total private R&D increases.
We empirically test the main prediction of the theoretical model, using U.S. state-level
panel data for the period 1999 to 2007. We use federal non-R&D procurement data provided
by the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation (FPDS-NG) to proxy for the size
of the government market. The technological content of procurement is measured as the ratio
between federal non-R&D procurement in high-tech industries and in all other industries. Our
indicator for private R&D is the amount of privately funded company R&D expenditures.
The impact of the technological composition of procurement on company R&D is assessed
by means of FE estimation (including several robustness checks). However, to overcome
potential bias in the FE estimation, which could result from reverse causality and omitted
variables, we additionally apply an IV approach. To instrument for the composition of federal
procurement, we rely on the idea that federal procurement in high-tech industries may be
relatively high in states whose governors belong to the House majority party. Prior results in
the political science literature suggest that politicians use procurement to reward their voters
and to increase their re-election chances. Attracting federal procurement contracts increases
the re-election chances of the state governor, who, in return, invest his political capital to
support the Congressmen in his states. Governors are more able to channel procurement
to their states if they belong to the House majority party, which, for instance, holds the
majority in committees authorizing and appropriating funds. Moreover, procurement in high-
tech industries is particularly attractive for politicians because, for instance, it is typically
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Our results provide some support for the theoretical prediction of a positive association
between an increase in the technological content of public procurement and privately funded
company R&D. According to the results of the FE estimation, doubling the high-tech ratio of
federal non-R&D procurement is associated, ceteris paribus, with an increase in private R&D
outlays of approximately 7 percent. Evaluated at the respective sample means, the estimates
imply that if the federal government increases the ratio of procurement in high-tech industries
relative to all other industries from 65 to 130 percent, then privately funded company R&D
expenditures will increase by $255 million. In the IV estimations, the coeﬃcient of interest
increases, which indicates that the true causal eﬀect of the technological composition of
government procurement on private R&D activities might be underestimated in the FE
approach. A possible reason for such underestimation could be that the distribution of
federal procurement is (partly) determined by issues other than eﬃciency, for instance, when
federal contracts are awarded to stimulate less innovative and less well performing ﬁrms.
However, in the IV approach, the coeﬃcient on the technological content of procurement is
not statistically signiﬁcant. The large standard error of the IV coeﬃcient may be the result
of the eﬃciency loss entailed in the IV estimator compared with the FE estimator, which is
especially severe in samples of this size. However, we cannot rule out that our instrument
explains too little of the variation in the potentially endogenous explanator to ensure the
validity of our inferences. Therefore, at the current stage, we tend to place more weight on
the FE estimates.
Can a shift in the composition of government purchases in favor of high-tech industries
spur ﬁrms’ R&D investment and work as a de facto innovation policy tool? In general, our
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role in companies’ R&D decisions, whether this is actively sought by the government or not.
One consequence to be drawn from our analysis is that policy should not be agnostic about
the impact of their purchasing behavior on private R&D decisions. If high-tech and low-tech
solutions for the same problem are available, public authorities should take into account that
purchasing the high-tech solution may come along with the additional beneﬁt of an increase
in private R&D. In acknowledging the relevance of the government as a customer on the
innovative behavior of ﬁrms, we complement earlier studies on the role of proﬁt incentives
and market size in innovation (e.g., Acemoglu and Linn, 2004; Schmookler, 1966).
We believe that the research question addressed in this paper possesses a substantial de-
gree of policy relevance. Some major initiatives have recently been launched to encourage
public authorities to take into account the technological content of products and services
in their purchasing decisions (Edler and Georghiou, 2007, and the references cited therein).
However, it is important to note that the fundamental procurement function is to deliver
quality goods and services in a timely fashion and at a reasonable price. The deliberate use
of public procurement as a tool for R&D and innovation policy implies distorting this demand
and may come at substantial social costs. First, there is less transparency in the procure-
ment process when factors other than the price are the main decision criteria. Second, the
government procurement in certain industries might signal, from companies’ point of view,
that certain technological paradigms in economic development are perceived to have greater
potential than others. Consequently, ﬁrms might be more likely to invest in certain technolo-
gies than they would have in the absence of the government demand signal. This presents the
government with the burden of selecting very carefully which technologies to back to avoid
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the existence of negative externalities associated with private R&D (see, e.g., Aghion and
Howitt, 1992) the relationship between R&D and social welfare might be nonlinear. In other
words, from a social point of view, there could also be “too many” productive resources
employed in the R&D process. If this was the case, a procurement policy to induce addi-
tional R&D would not be desirable from a social viewpoint. We have not yet accounted for
such welfare considerations in the empirical analysis. Fourth, procedural aspects of awarding
federal procurement contracts (for example, competitive versus non-competitive procedures)
are neglected in this paper but might, in general, play an important role (Lichtenberg, 1988).
Finally, giving reasonable policy advice requires a cost-beneﬁt comparison of procurement
with other innovation policy tools, such as R&D subsidies or R&D tax credits etc (e.g., David
et al., 2000; Wilson, 2009). Only after having taken into account the potential (opportunity)
cost of government procurement are we able to judge its suitability as a tool for innovation
policy. This is an important avenue for future research.
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In this appendix, we derive the relation between ε1 and ε2 for the public demand in (12) rule
to be feasible. Recall that, by deﬁnition, the following holds:
￿ 1
0 G(ω)dω ≡ ¯ G. Substituting
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dω, (18)
where g(λ) is the Pareto density function with a scale parameter equal to one and a share
parameter equal to 1/κ. According to (9), we can express g(λ) as 1/κλ−(1+κ)/κ, which allows
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Solving the integral above gives:
1 ￿
0













By deﬁnition, the expression on the RHS of (19) is equal to ¯ G. It is now straightforward
to show that this relationship determines the unique ratio between ε1 and ε2, which is equal
to:
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Because the RHS of (20) is strictly positive, but smaller than one, it follows that ε1 < ε2.
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When we take into account (5), the expected value of the proﬁt ﬂow that accrues to the
winner of an R&D race in industry ω at time t can be written as (suppressing time and







L(c + G)g(λ)dλ. (21)
We substitute for the Pareto density function, g(λ), and for public demand spending,
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dλ. (22)
The term (λ − 1)(1/λ)λ−(1+κ)/κ can be simpliﬁed to (λ − 1)λ−2−1/κ. Keeping this in




















In Appendix A, we showed that there exists a speciﬁc relationship between ε1 and ε2,
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Notice that 0 < 1 − (1 − κ)
1/κ < 1 for all κ ∈ (0,1) and, thus, 1
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c + ¯ G + γΓ

, (25)








> 0, deﬁned for notational simplicity, is completely
determined by parameter values. Because the RHS of (25) does not depend on industry-
speciﬁc variables, πe is to be interpreted as the average value of proﬁts that an industry
leader in this economy expects.
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Labor demand in manufacturing equals the aggregate demand from both private and public
consumers (recall that the production function in manufacturing reads Y = Ly and that we
































Using the Pareto density function given in (9), as well as the public demand rule as
speciﬁed in (12) and (20), the total employment necessary to satisfy private and public
consumers’ demand for the consumption good can be calculated as:
LY(t) = L(t)
c(t) + ¯ G − γκΓ
1 + κ
.
An equation for the R&D labor can be derived from solving (7) for the R&D input of a
ﬁrm in industry ω and then aggregating over the continuum of industries ω ∈ [0,1]. Further
taking into account that we assume symmetric behavior, that is, the industry-level innovation





Labor-market clearing implies that L(t) = LY(t) + LI(t) is always fulﬁlled, which, when
slightly rewritten, gives (15).
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In this appendix, we solve for the steady state of this economy, in which all endogenous
variables grow at a constant (although not necessarily at the same) rate and research intensity
I(t) is common across industries. We already established in the main text that a constant
growth rate constrains constrains I, ˙ x/x, and ˙ c/c to be constant over time, while the latter
implies r(t) = ρ. Equations (8), (14), and (15) represent a system of three equations in three
unknowns x, c, and I. Solving this system of equations allows us to uniquely determine the
steady-state values for all endogenous variables.
We ﬁrst derive an expression for the equilibrium research intensity, I∗. Taking the log-







According to equation (26), the steady-state value of the research intensity is completely
pinned down by the population growth rate, n, and the parameter governing the R&D
diﬃculty, µ.
Having determined the equilibrium value of I, we are now in the position to solve for the
steady-state values of x and c. Given (26) and that r = ρ holds along the steady state, the





1+κ(c(t) + ¯ G + γΓ)
ρ + n( 1
µ − 1)
. (27)
Equation (27) deﬁnes a negative linear relationship between the per capita private con-
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becomes:
1 =






deﬁning a positive linear relationship between c and x. Equation (27) is an upward
sloping line in the (c,x) space while (28) is a downward sloping linear function in the (c,x)
space. The necessary and suﬃcient condition for both lines to have a unique and positive
intersection is given by ¯ G < 1. Solving the system of linear equations in (27) and (28) by








µρ(1 + κ + γκΓ − ¯ G) − n[ ¯ G(1 + κ − µ) + (1 + κ)(µ − 1) + γκµΓ]
n(1 + κ − µ) + µρ
. (30)
Finally, we calculate the steady-state growth rate of the economy. Because we refrain
from capital accumulation, the concept of growth in the model relates to growth in each
individual’s utility. This property is shared by all Schumpeterian growth models in which
ﬁrms’ R&D eﬀorts are directed toward increasing the product quality, and the per capita
consumption does not change in equilibrium. However, even if the amount of goods consumed
per person remains constant, the individual utility in (2) augments when R&D turns out to
be successful. To obtain an explicit expression for the utility growth rate, we substitute for
consumer demand in (2) by using (3):
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0 jmax (ω,t)dω is a measure of the number of quality improvements aggregated
over all industries, ω ∈ [0,1]. The index jmax increases when ﬁrms are successful in innovating
and engage in R&D in all industries throughout time in any steady-state equilibrium. In each
industry ω, the (Poisson distributed) probability of exactly m improvements within a time






where f(m,τ) represents the measure of products that are improved exactly m times in
an interval of length τ. Following Davidson and Segerstrom (1998),
￿ 1
0 jmax (ω,t)dω then
equals tI. Taking this and (26) into account, diﬀerentiating (31) with respect to time yields








This completes the characterization of the steady state of this economy.
17 Notice that the ﬁrst integral on the RHS of (31) is constant along the balanced-growth path. We further
exploit the fact that quality jumps follow a Pareto distribution, so, using (9),
￿ 1
0 log[λ(ω,t)]dω = κ.
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We use federal procurement data provided by FPDS-NG in the period from 1997 to 2007.
During the import of the raw data from the FPDS-NG data archives18, we performed data
corrections to accommodate changes in the industry code from the 1997 and 2002 NAICS to
the 2007 NAICS system. Although most federal statistical agencies adopted NAICS codes
already in 1997 to replace the Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) system, only a small
fraction of contracts in the FPDS-NG database are assigned a NAICS code in the years before
2001.
To be able to properly identify high-tech industries also in the years before 2001, we exploit
the fact that we have information on the PSC for almost all contracts. The FPDS-NG user’s
manual reports that the PSC is required to correlate to the selected NAICS code (GSA,
2008). Moreover, according to the Federal Acquisition Regulation, the NAICS code “best
describes the principal nature of the product or service being acquired” GSA (2005, p. 19.1-
3). Therefore, we develop a PSC-NAICS concordance based on contract data for 2001 to 2009
for which both code categories are available. Using this concordance table, we assign NAICS
codes to all contracts for which an industry classiﬁcation had previously been missing.19
If more than one NAICS code applies to a PSC, each of the respective industries receives
a share of the contract’s total value with the share being equal to the relative frequency
18 The raw data ﬁles are available at www.fpds.gov.
19 A further virtue of using the PSC-NAICS concordance to assign an industry classiﬁcation code to con-
tracts without a NAICS code is that we can take into account contracts for which a NAICS code has
not been reported by the contracting agency for strategic reasons, for example, to circumvent size stan-
dards for certain contracts. The FPDS-NG data show that the Department of Defense, especially, does
often not report NAICS codes associated with its contract actions. An analysis conducted by the con-
sultant Aronson LLC suggests that this is mainly due to bypass size limitations for certain contracts
(http://www.aronsonblogs.com/gcsg/?p=135).
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part of a contract’s value that gets “lost” during the aggregation of contracts to the industry
level. After having identiﬁed to which industries public purchases can be assigned, we exclude
federal procurement within the public sector (NAICS 92). For the reasons mentioned in the
main text, we also drop R&D procurement contracts, which can be identiﬁed using the PSC.
We obtain state-level procurement data by using information on the state where the con-
tract was performed, which is mandatory for the procurement oﬃcers to report in the FPDS-
NG database (GSA, 2008). Moreover, information on the place of performance allows us to
focus on domestic federal procurement, excluding all government contracts performed outside
the U.S. We also exclude procurement contracts performed in the District of Columbia. The
deﬂator used for the conversion of current to constant contract value (base year 2000) is the
Government Consumption Expenditures and Gross Investment Index (GCEGII). We prefer
GCEGII over the Consumer Price Index because the “market basket of goods“ purchased
by the federal government may be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the purchases of the typical
household.
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Table 5: Pairwise correlation coeﬃcients.
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7)




3) Procurement all other 0.60 0.78 1
4) High-tech ratio 0.41 0.77 0.21 1
5) Real GDP 0.89 0.77 0.77 0.42 1
6) Real GDP growth -0.02 -0.05 -0.09 0.01 -0.03 1
7) Population 0.86 0.77 0.78 0.41 0.99 -0.05 1
Notes: See main text for further details on the construction of the variables. All variables are log-transformed.
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